The US commands Korea’s military. Japan literally sacrificed their own economy to prop up the US in the 80s. You can’t achieve sovereignty from the US by making deals with other vassals, because the US can simply lean on them if they don’t like it.
Europe
I don’t see Europe becoming more independent at this point given 30 years of liberalism hollowing out their industry and welfare state while supporting US foreign policy unconditionally.
The US does not command Korea’s military. They’re a large contributor to SK defense posture, sure, but Korea is a major economic powerhouse in its own right (see: chip foundries), builds their own AEGIS-parity ships - and generally have some of the most advanced and productive shipyards in the world - and the largest standing army in the world at 3.6Mactivepersonnel. They have a thriving international military arms trade in terrestrial units and munitions (see: Poland). They are also beginning to roll out an indigenously produced 5th gen fighter, amongst many other interesting technological and military products and advancements.
Getting absolutely stomped twice in rapid succession (by Imperial Japan - saved by the fall of Imperial Japan; by NK - saved by UN (though primarily US) intervention) tends to focus one’s priorities on defense.
Also, strategically speaking, their huge chip foundries are an incentives for allies to pitch in, for the same reason Taiwan’s chip industry is a huge incentive for allies to pitch in - the entire rest of the economic world basically revolves around what they can make. And nobody wants their economy to crash, so there’d be a lot of assistance for SK if NK (or anyone else) decided to try to wreck them again.
Japan is to some degree in the same boat - though I dare say if the US pulls back from allies in east Asia, I do think there’s a good chance they’d set aside some of the historical animosity out of sheer pragmatism and the potential for mutual defense (a fringe benefit of being involved in the US-centric arms pipeline for so long is implicit system compatibility - if not direct, then much easier to adapt and modify for compatibility).
As to Europe: we’ll see how that goes. The EU seems to be partially waking up and taking things more seriously, but they’re also for the most part world fucking champions at bureaucracy-ing themselves to death. At the same time, the Brits and French have nukes, which, if they actually fully commit to continental defense (and if nukes proliferate more), is a bit of a trump (no relation) card.
The US takes control at will during times of war, as determined by the US, and the exercises occur with the US in command. The difference between this and the US commanding SK forces all the time is not meaningful.
The US commands Korea’s military. Japan literally sacrificed their own economy to prop up the US in the 80s. You can’t achieve sovereignty from the US by making deals with other vassals, because the US can simply lean on them if they don’t like it.
I don’t see Europe becoming more independent at this point given 30 years of liberalism hollowing out their industry and welfare state while supporting US foreign policy unconditionally.
The US does not command Korea’s military. They’re a large contributor to SK defense posture, sure, but Korea is a major economic powerhouse in its own right (see: chip foundries), builds their own AEGIS-parity ships - and generally have some of the most advanced and productive shipyards in the world - and the largest standing army in the world at 3.6M active personnel. They have a thriving international military arms trade in terrestrial units and munitions (see: Poland). They are also beginning to roll out an indigenously produced 5th gen fighter, amongst many other interesting technological and military products and advancements.
Getting absolutely stomped twice in rapid succession (by Imperial Japan - saved by the fall of Imperial Japan; by NK - saved by UN (though primarily US) intervention) tends to focus one’s priorities on defense.
Also, strategically speaking, their huge chip foundries are an incentives for allies to pitch in, for the same reason Taiwan’s chip industry is a huge incentive for allies to pitch in - the entire rest of the economic world basically revolves around what they can make. And nobody wants their economy to crash, so there’d be a lot of assistance for SK if NK (or anyone else) decided to try to wreck them again.
Japan is to some degree in the same boat - though I dare say if the US pulls back from allies in east Asia, I do think there’s a good chance they’d set aside some of the historical animosity out of sheer pragmatism and the potential for mutual defense (a fringe benefit of being involved in the US-centric arms pipeline for so long is implicit system compatibility - if not direct, then much easier to adapt and modify for compatibility).
As to Europe: we’ll see how that goes. The EU seems to be partially waking up and taking things more seriously, but they’re also for the most part world fucking champions at bureaucracy-ing themselves to death. At the same time, the Brits and French have nukes, which, if they actually fully commit to continental defense (and if nukes proliferate more), is a bit of a trump (no relation) card.
The US takes control at will during times of war, as determined by the US, and the exercises occur with the US in command. The difference between this and the US commanding SK forces all the time is not meaningful.