Thanks for the reply. Just to clarify: nothing in ICT-1.1 involves metaphors like “love as a force”. These are your own analogies, not part of the model.

ICT-1.1 is strictly empirical. If you think it’s “technobabble”, the simplest way to show that is to point out which of the three falsifiable predictions below is untestable:

1. Monotonic neural/metabolic response to informational novelty (odd-ball gamma connectivity, MEG/EEG — standard).

2. Equal-energy / different-information stimuli producing different system responses (same protocols used in sensory neuroscience).

3. kT·ln2-scale fixation thresholds across physical substrates (classic Landauer-scale measurements on PCM/memristors).

The specific experiments — with full methodology, parameters, and falsifiable predictions — are described in Section 8 of the preprint.

If any of these fail → ICT is wrong. If they’re “continental philosophy”, then so are Shannon, Landauer and Friston.

Happy to discuss specifics if you want — criticism is welcome, but it has to be about the actual experiments.

Thanks for the comment. Just to clarify: ICT isn’t continental philosophy — it’s an information-theoretic model with explicit falsifiable experiments.

ICT-1.1 is based on three empirical protocols:

1. dI/dT → neural/energetic response Prediction: increasing informational novelty changes gamma connectivity & metabolic cost. If no monotonic effect is observed → ICT is wrong.

2. “Structure without energy” tests Equal-power stimuli but different informational structure. Prediction: different neural/material responses despite identical energy. If no difference → ICT is wrong.

3. Energy cost of fixation across substrates Measuring kT·ln2-scale thresholds in memristors, PCM, organoids, etc. If fixation cost doesn’t correlate → ICT is wrong.

All three are measurable and falsifiable. This is experimental physics, not philosophy.