There is an argument that free will doesn’t exist because there is an unbroken chain of causality we are riding on that dates back to the beginning of time. Meaning that every time you fart, scratch your nose, blink, or make lifechanging decisions there is a pre existing reason. These reasons might be anything from the sensory enviornment you were in the past minute, the hormone levels in your bloodstream at the time, hormones you were exposed to as a baby, or how you were parented growing up. No thought you have is really original and is more like a domino affect of neurons firing off in reaction to what you have experienced. What are your thoughts on this?
We have free will, but the majority are not free to exercise it because of material conditions and/or circumstance.
No, we don’t have free will. HOWEVER, I don’t think that arguement will hold up in court.
It can’t hold up in court. It ultimately does not matter whether someone is compelled to do evil, or chooses to do evil. Society must be protected in either case
You have free will, but you also have chains that bound you.
Starting from the social order, you need money and other social relations (friends, family, bosses) to literally survive in the modern world - you’re not omnipotent.
Then you have the cognitive chains - stuff you know and understand, as well stuff you can invent (or reinvent) from your current knowledge - you are not omnipresent.
Then, as a consequence, without these two, you cannot be (omni)benevolent - you’ll always fuck something up (and even if you didn’t, most actions positive towards something will have a negative impact towards something else).
All these are pretty much categorically impossible to exist - you’re not some god-damn deity.
But does this mean free will doesn’t exist?
Hardly. It’s just not as ultimate a power or virtue as some may put it. Flies or pigs also have free will - they’re free to roll in mud or lick a turd - except for when they’re not because they do it to survive (cool themselves or eat respectively).
We humans similarily eat and shit, and we go to work so we have something to eat and someplace to shit. Otherwise you die without the former or get fined without the latter.
So that’s what free will is - the ability of an organism to guide what it’s doing, how, when (and, to some extent, even why) it’s doing it, according to its senses and sensibilities. It’s the process with which we put our own, unique spin on the things in our lives.
Being an omnipotent, omnipresent and (omni)benevolent would in fact remove the essence of what free will (with all its limits) is, because our actions wouldn’t have any meaningful consequences. It’d all just be an effective (what I’ll call negative) chaos - a mishmush of everything only understandable to the diety.
So in fact, the essence of “free” will is that it’s free within some bounds - some we’ve set ourselves, some we’re forced with (disabilities, cognitive abilities, physical limits, etc.). Percisely in the alternative scenario would “free” will cease to be free - because someone already knows it all - past, present future, local and global, from each atom on up. There’s perfect causality - as perfect as a movie. You can’t change it meaningfully - any changes become a remix or remaster - they lose their originality.
With the limits on our thinking which cause us to be less-than-perfect, they cause a kind of positive chaos, one where one tries to do their best with what they have on their disposal - as they say, you get to know people best at their lowest. Similarily, everyone gets corrupted at a high enough power level - some just do it sooner than others. So surely, at an infinite power level, not even someone omnipotent, omnipresent and (omni)benevolent all at once would be able to curb this flaw.
Local causality doesn’t imply unbroken universal causality. In fact, the idea everything is a purely deterministic projection of some initial state is far weirder than the idea that stochastic actions can influence a partially deterministic state.
You gave an argument against free will based on Determinism, but there are other good and even better arguments IMO. Like the science-centrist arguments of Neuroscience , Psychological and the Evolutionary Arguments. Then there are the philosophical Arguments from Divine Predestination or Fate. There are still more but the fun is on the discovery.
Every decision you make and everything that happens is based on conditions, and nothing exists outside of conditions.
In the ultimate sense there’s no such thing as free will, because everything has a conditioned existence.
Yes. Every person has to believe in it to accept the notion of good and evil.
In a deterministic reality, where all things are due and subject to causation, there can be no free will. If we did not live in a causal reality, we’d never be able to make accurate predictions or models.
“Randomness” is not free will either. If you’re not in complete control of your influences, then you can not be said to have free will. Randomness does nothing to help the argument for free will.
With that said. Regardless of the existence of free will, what does exists is your awareness of what it’s like to be you. To be in the circumstances that currently govern your life. And in that awareness exists the boundless capacity for compassion. Once you understand that no one is in control of their lives, that all things are causal, it allows you to be less judgmental.
"If a man is crossing a river and an empty boat collides with his own skiff, he will not become angry. He will simply guide his boat around it.
But if he sees a person in the boat, he will shout at the other to steer clear. If the shout is not heard, and the boats collide, he will curse the other person.
Yet, if the boat were empty, he would not be angry."
— Chuang Tzu (Zhuangzi)
I wrote a simple explanation of determinism in a blog post earlier this year (there’s an audio version available as well.) https://mrfunkedude.wordpress.com/2024/12/03/following-the-strings/
Just pointing this out - we don’t live in a deterministic reality. Quantum interactions are inherently probabilistic and can’t be predetermined. This usually doesn’t matter, but you can chain larger classical systems onto quantum interactions (i.e. Schrödingers cat), which makes them non-deterministic as well.
Thanks for the reply.
“inherently probabilistic and can’t be determined” is just another way of saying “random” or “we don’t know yet”.
If reality was not deterministic, the reliability of models and predictions in physics would be upended.
“inherently probabilistic and can’t be determined” is just another way of saying “random” or “we don’t know yet”.
Well yes, it means “random”. Of course there’s always a chance that we’re just missing something fundamental, but it would mean that literally every model we have is completely wrong. Unless we find indications for that (and there don’t seem to be any so far) I think it’s fair to assume that quantum interactions are actually random.
If reality was not deterministic, the reliability of models and predictions in physics would be upended.
No, because reality is not deterministic, yet the reliability of models and predictions in physics is not upended. There simply are enough of these interactions happening that, in the “macro” world, we can talk about them deterministically, since they are probabilistic. But that doesn’t mean the “micro” interactions are deterministic, and it also doesn’t mean it’s impossible for a “macro” interaction to be non-deterministic - again, the example of Schrödingers cat comes to mind.
You could literally build a non-deterministic experiment right now if you wanted to.
In a sense it is deterministic. It’s just when most people think of determinism, they think of conditioning on the initial state, and that this provides sufficient constraints to predict all future states. In quantum mechanics, conditioning on the initial state does not provide sufficient constraints to predict all future states and leads to ambiguities. However, if you condition on both the initial state and the final state, you appear to get determinstic values for all of the observables. It seems to be deterministic, just not forwards-in-time deterministic, but “all-at-once” deterministic. Laplace’s demon would just need to know the very initial conditions of the universe and the very final conditions.
Hm, I’m not sure if I understand the abstract correctly.
Say I build two Schrödingers cat experiments next to each other, and connect them so that each vial dispersing the poison also makes the other vial disperse poison. I go away, and come back to both vials having triggered and both nuclear decays having occurred. How could I determine the path the whole system took?
I am not that good with abstract language. It helps to put it into more logical terms.
It sounds like what you are saying is that you begin with something a superposition of states like (1/√2)(|0⟩ + |1⟩) which we could achieve with the H operator applied to |0⟩ and then you make that be the cause of something else which we would achieve with the CX operator and would give us (1/√2)(|00⟩ + |11⟩) and then measure it. We can call these t=0 starting in the |00⟩ state, then t=1 we apply H operator to the least significant, and then t=2 is the CX operator with the control on the least significant.
I can’t answer it for the two cats literally because they are made up it a gorillion particles and computing it for all of them would be computationally impossible. But in this simple case you would just compute the weak values which requires you to also condition on the final state which in this case the final states could be |00⟩ or |11⟩. For each observable, let’s say we’re interested in the one at t=x, you construct your final state vector by starting on this final state, specifically its Hermitian transpose, and multiplying it by the reversed unitary evolution from t=2 to t=x and multiply that by the observable then multiply that by the forwards-in-time evolution from t=0 to t=x multiplied by the initial state, and then normalize the whole thing by dividing it by the Hermitian transpose of the final state times the whole reverse time evolution from t=2 to t=0 and then by the final state.
In the case where the measured state at t=3 is |00⟩ we get for the observables (most significant followed by least significant)…
- t=0: (0,0,+1);(+1,+i,+1)
- t=1: (0,0,+1);(+1,-i,+1)
- t=2: (0,0,+1);(0,0,+1)
In the case where the measured state at t=3 is |11⟩ we get for the observables…
- t=0: (0,0,+1);(-1,-i,+1)
- t=1: (0,0,+1);(+1,+i,-1)
- t=2: (0,0,-1);(0,0,-1)
The values |0⟩ and |1⟩ just mean that the Z observable has a value of +1 or -1, so if we just look at the values of the Z observables we can rewrite this in something a bit more readable.
- |00⟩ → |00⟩ → |00⟩
- |00⟩ → |01⟩ → |11⟩
Even though the initial conditions both began at |00⟩ they have different values on their other observables which then plays a role in subsequent interactions. The least significant qubit in the case where the final state is |00⟩ begins with a different signage on its Y observable than in the case when the outcome is |11⟩. That causes the H opreator to have a different impact, in one case it flips the least significant qubit and in another case it does not. If it gets flipped then, since it is the control for the CX operator, it will flip the most significant qubit as well, but if it’s not then it won’t flip it.
Notice how there is also no t=3, because t=3 is when we measure, and the algorithm guarantees that the values are always in the state you will measure before you measure them. So your measurement does reveal what is really there.
If we say |0⟩ = no sleepy gas is released and the cat is awake, and |1⟩ = sleepy gas is released and the cat go sleepy time, then in the case where both cats are observed to be awake when you opened the box, at t=1: |00⟩ meaning the first one’s sleepy gas didn’t get released, and so at t=2: |00⟩ it doesn’t cause the other one’s to get released. In the case where both cats are observed to be asleep when you open the box, then t=1: |01⟩ meaning the first one’s did get released, and at t=2: |11⟩ that causes the second’s to be released.
When you compute this algorithm you find that the values of the observables are always set locally. Whenever two particles interact such that they become entangled, then they will form correlations for their observables in that moment and not later when you measure them, and you can even figure out what those values specifically are.
To borrow an analogy I heard from the physicist Emily Adlam, causality in quantum mechanics is akin to filling out a Sudoku puzzle. The global rules and some “known” values constrains the puzzle so that you are only capable of filling in very specific values, and so the “known” values plus the rules determine the rest of the values. If you are given the initial and final conditions as your “known” values plus the laws of quantum mechanics as the global rules constraining the system, then there is only one way you can fill in these numbers, those being the values for the observables.
Sorry, it’s been a long time since I last looked at the mathematical side of quantum mechanics, so most of your comment flew over my head. Let me put it in as simple terms as I can:
If there are multiple paths a system can take to reach a final state, how can you accurately determine which path was taken if you only know the initial & final state? IMO this shouldn’t be possible.
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Maybe not 100% because I am the sum of my experiences but I can choose to act against my impulses if I want to.
Thoughts and muscle movements come about through the opening and closing of ion channels that allow information to travel through neurons and for muscle fibers to contract and relax. ‘Free will’ in the sense that our mind is separate from our body and that it can somehow open those ion channels is a combination of dualism and molecular telekinesis, so I do not believe that, no.
But I do believe that consciousness is an essential emergent property of our brain. What we experience might be the output of a causal prediction engine in our brain that is making a prediction about the immediate sensory experience in a way that we can respond to stimuli before they happen. In that sense, yes, I do believe in free will because that conscious output that I experience is me! This prediction machine is me making predictions and choices.
I think that a materialist framing of free will requires accepting some model of consciousness in which consciousness is not just a weird accident but is a physical phenomenon that is part of us. An essential feature of how our brain works. This is not yet demonstrated (very difficult if not impossible to do so), but I think it is. Then ‘free will’ and ‘a material system following the laws of physics’ is no longer a contradiction.
Is the emergent phenomena, consciousness, weak or strong? I think the former, which I think you support, posits a panpsychism and the latter is indistinguishable from magic.
I’m a little confused about the relationship between the causal prediction machine (CPM) and the self. to reiterate, the brain has a causal prediction engine. It’s inputs are immediate sensory experience. I assume the causal prediction engines’ output is predictions. These predictions are limited to the what the next sensory stimuli might be in response to the recent sensory input. These predictions lead to choices. Or maybe the same as choices.
So these outputs are experienced. And that experience of making predictions is me. Am I the one experiencing the predictions as well?
So this sentence confuses me: “This prediction machine is me making predictions and choices.” Am I making the predictions or is it the CPM?
I think that its emergence is weak but I see no resolution to the hard problem of consciousness any time soon, so for the time my opinions about it are ideas that I find compelling and intuitive and not grounded in facts and evidence. Weak emergence does posit some form of pansychism in the sense that sentient-like behavior can emerge in other brains and even that characteristics that we might associate with sentience might emerge from other phenomena present through the universe. But, because of the same reasons that the hard problem is hard, it is also hard to study and learn about these phenomena.
I can try to explain a little better what I meant.
I don’t believe we have “free will” in the sense that the mind is separate from the body (dualism) and that it is able to break the laws of physics by altering our physiological processes. I don’t think that the non-determinism of quantum mechanics in itself gives us agency, and our mind does not have a mechanism to select how a particular wavev function collapses (not a fan of the Orch OR model).
So, in this traditional sense my answer is “no, we do not have free will”
But I think that the existential crisis and feeling of a lack of agency stems from the model of sentience that one believes. If one rejects dualism, posits that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain, but then ascribes only very loosely a mechanism to consciousness such as ‘complex information processing gives rise to consciousness’, then sentience appears to be just some unexplained quirk that is not essential and just happens to be there. Combining a lack of dualism and free will with consciousness being a useless quirk is what (I think) creates the existential crisis associated with a lack of free will. I used to fall into this camp of thought and resolved the crisis through a logic such as: “Yeah, there is no free will, living is nice though so I am happy that I can accidentally experience the world”.
What pushed me to re-assess this way of thinking originally was reading through a paper about teaching a dish of neurons how to play pong](https://www.cell.com/neuron/fulltext/S0896-6273(22)00806-6). At first it did not make sense to me how one can possibly provide feedback to a group of isolated neurons such that it could learn to play a game. What ‘reward’ can you give a group of neurons to push them to do what you want?!
I looked into Karl Friston, the last author of that paper, which led me down a path of study. I discovered Judea Pearl, who formalized causal reasoning in a way that lets us build statistical models to move from correlations to counterfactual causes. This makes it possible to teach causal inference even to machines.
Karl Friston’s work and other researchers in the field argue that the brain is a computer built for causal computing. This idea underpins the Bayesian brain, Predictive Coding Theory, Active Inference.
In Karl Friston’s Active Inference book, sentience is proposed to emerge as a result of the prediction engine. What we experience is not actually what our senses already experienced, but instead it is what our brain expects that we will sense in the next instant. This model of reality that is built by our brain in its attempt to perform its basic function (link causes to effects in order to predict the next stimulus).
One idea is that consciousness emerges because the predictive brain is creating a ‘model’ that does not exist in physical space and so it needs imagination to explore it. The imagination of things that do not exist is essential to the process of generating counterfactuals, and counterfactuals are at the core of the causality machine. To show that A causes B, you need to imagine a situation in which A is not present and estimate the likelyhood of B. One idea is that it is precisely in the creation of a world without A that sentience emerges.
A lot of these ideas are not falsifiable, so it is difficult to say that this is indeed the mechanism of consciousness. But some of the ideas are falsifiable, and those ideas have helped these researchers teach neurons how to play pong, so I think they might have a point.
So, then, I find it plausible that consciousness is not a quirk but an essential feature of our brain. To me this resolves the free will crisis because my consciousness is not an accidental outcome of physical processes just chaotically whizzing by but an actual feature of the machinery that is me.
So these outputs are experienced. And that experience of making predictions is me. Am I the one experiencing the predictions as well?
So this sentence confuses me: “This prediction machine is me making predictions and choices.” Am I making the predictions or is it the CPM?
I am this machine and I follow the laws of physics. I am part of physical reality, and my sentience is a feature of who I am. If I do something it is because I chose to do so, and the fact that I chose to do so in accordance to the law of physics does not remove my agency.
Sorry for the long delay. I think engaging with the material and what you wrote requires some reflection time and, unfortunately, my time for that is limited these days. And so while I was hoping to offer a more robust response after having read the links you provided, I think engagement was more necessary to keep the conversation fresh even if I’ve only had a glance at the material.
The brain in the dish study seems to be interesting and raised new questions for me. “What is a brain?” comes to mind. For me, I have a novice level understanding of the structures of the brain and the role in neurotransmitters, hormones, neuron structures, etc. But I’ve never really examined what a brain is and how it is something more than or other than it’s component parts and their operations.
Some other questions would be:
- What is the relationship between brain and mind?
- What do we mean by mind? Do all brains create a mind?
- Or, in context of this conversation, do all brains have a CPM?
- Does adaptive environmental behavior by species without a brain indicate a CPM?
So those are some of the initial thoughts I had and would read the paper to see if the authors are even raising that question in their paper.
But more fundamentally, we still have to examine the mind-body problem. Recontextualizing it to a CPM, “what is the relationship between a CPM and either the brain or the mind?” I am unclear if the CPM is a mental or physical phenomena. There seems to be a certainty that the CPM is part of the brain, but the entirety of it’s output is non-physical. I imagine that we assume a narrative where the brain in the dish is creating a CPM because it demonstrates learning, adaptive behavior based upon external stimuli.
Ultimately, I bring it back to a framing question. Why choose weak emergence prematurely? It limits our investigation and imagination.
Well… that’s my set of issues. I’ll try to find time to read those articles in the next few days!
Cheers!
In my view, neuroscience may contribute to clarifying questions like:
-
Do all brains support a conscious predictive model (CPM)?
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Does adaptive behavior in brainless organisms suggest a primitive CPM?
-
What is the relationship between brain and mind?
But deeper questions, such as “What do we mean by mind?” or “Why assume weak emergence?” remain tied to the hard problem of consciousness, which currently lies beyond the reach of empirical science.
In trying to describe promising cognitive models, I buried my main point. I am not arguing that the brain and mind problem is close to a solution, or that science is close to resolving it.
Here is my actual point:
Certain materialist views unintentionally reproduce dualist thinking. Substance dualism claims that the mind exists outside physical law. Materialism, in contrast, holds that the mind emerges from brain activity. But when this emergence is explained only as complexity or undefined processing, a conceptual gap forms: brain -> black box -> mind. This reproduces dualism in practice, even if not in theory.
This gap renders consciousness a passive byproduct. It becomes a new kind of soul, unable to influence the body. A mind without agency.
Predictive processing and active inference models offer an alternative. They describe the brain as a generative system that continuously updates predictions based on sensory input. As summarized in a recent review:
Active inference casts the brain as a fantastic organ: a generator of fantasies, hypotheses and predictions that are tested against sensory evidence.
While these models do not resolve the hard problem, they help remove part of the black box. They suggest that consciousness may play a functional role in these feedback loops. It is not a detached illusion but a process embedded in how the brain operates.
For me, this shift changed how I think about free will. Not because it provides final answers, but because it allows me to see mental acts in a similar way to how I see muscle movement. These acts are constrained by physical laws, but they are still mine.
I’m going to stick with the meat of your point. To summarize,
- Some materialist views create a black box in which consciousness is a passive activity
brain -> black box -> mind - CPMs extract consciousness from the black box
- Consciousness plays a function role by providing feedback
brain -> black box -> CPM-> consciousness -> black box -> mind
But to go further,
stimuli -> brain -> black box -> CPM-> consciousness update CPM -> black box -> mind -> response to stimuliThe CPM as far as I can tell is the following:
representation of stimuli -> model (of the world with a modeled self) -> consciousness making predictions (of how the world changes if the self acts upon it) -> updating model -> updated prediction -> suspected desired resultI feel like I’ve mis-represented something of your position with the self. I think you’re saying that the self is the prediction maker. And that free will exists in the making of predictions. But presentation of the CPM places the self in the model. Furthermore, I think you’re saying that consciousness is a process of the brain and I think it’s of the mind. Can you remedy my representation of your position?
Quickly reading the review, I went to see if they posited role for the mind. I was disappointed to see that they, not only ignored it (unsurprising), but collapsed functions normally attributed to the mind to the brain. Ascribing predictions, fantasies, and hypotheses to the brain or calling it a statistical organ sidesteps the hard problem and collapses it into a physicalist view. They don’t posit a mind-body relationship, they speak about body and never acknowledge the mind. I find this frustrating.
I’m going to stick with the meat of your point. To summarize, …
That is not quite how I see it. The linear diagram “brain -> black box -> mind” represents a common mode of thinking about the mind as a by-product of complex brain activity. Modern theories are a lot more integrative. Conscious perception is not just a byproduct of the form brain -> black box -> mind, but instead it is an essential active element in the thought process.
Ascribing predictions, fantasies, and hypotheses to the brain or calling it a statistical organ sidesteps the hard problem and collapses it into a physicalist view. They don’t posit a mind-body relationship, they speak about body and never acknowledge the mind. I find this frustrating.
That text was probably written by a materialist / physicalist, and this view is consistent within this framework. It is OK that you find this frustrating, and it is also alright if you don’t accept the materialist / physicalist viewpoint. I am not making an argument about materialism being the ultimate truth, or about materialism having all of the answers - especially not answers relating to the hard problem! I am specifically describing how different frameworks held by people who already hold a materialist view can lead to different ways of understanding free will.
Scientists often do sidestep the hard problem in the sense that they acknowledge it to be “hard” and keep moving without dwelling on it. There are many philosophers (David Chalmers, Daniel Dennett, Stuart R. Hameroff), that do like getting into the nitty-gritty about the hard problem, so there is plenty of material about it, but the general consensus is that the answers to the hard problem cannot be find using the materialist’s toolkit.
Materialists have is a mechanism for building consensus via the scientific method. This consensus mechanism has allowed us to understand a lot about the world. I share your frustration in that this class of methods does not seem to be capable of solving the hard problem.
We may never discover a mechanism to build consensus on the hard problem, and unfortunately this means that answers to many very important questions will remain subjective. As an example, if we eventually implement active inference into a computer, and the computer claims to be conscious, we may have no consensus mechanism to determine whether they “really” are conscious or not, just as we cannot ascertain today whether the people around us are conscious. In my opinion, yes, it is physically possible to build conscious systems, and at some point it will get tricky because it will remain a matter of opinion. It will be an extremely polarizing topic.
I should start off and say I’m less interested in the quesiton of free will than the relationship between consciousness and matter. I want to reframe that so you know what I’m focused on.
Modern theories are a lot more integrative. … [I]nstead it is an essential active element in the thought process.
Here, I’m assuming “it” is a conscious perception. But now I’m confused again because I don’t think any theory of mind would deny this.
On the other hand, if “it” is “the brain” then I need to know more about the theory. As I understanding it, the theory says that the brain creates models. Models are mental. I just don’t know how that escapes the black box that connects to the mind. But as you assert and I understand, it is:
stimuli -> CPM ⊆ brain -> consciousness update CPM -?> black box -?> mind -?> brain -> nervous system -> response to stimuliIf it isn’t obvious, the question marks represent where I don’t understand the model.
So if I were to narrow down my concerns, it would be:
- Is a model a mental process?
- If mental processes are part of the brain, then how so?
- Some materialist views create a black box in which consciousness is a passive activity
-
Tl;Dr, yes*
I find this discussion to be an exercise in frustration. There’s a lot of philosophical jargon that gets glazed over and nuances that often get ignored. I also think it’s an incredibly complex and complicated topic that we simply do not have enough information available to us to determine in a scientific manner.
For instance: what kind of “free will” are we talking about? Often it’s “Libertarian Free Will,” that is, absolute agency uninfluenced by any external factors. This much is disproven scientifically, as our brains run countless “subconscious” calculations in response to our environment to hasten decision making and is absolutely influenced by a myriad of factors, regardless of if you’re conciously aware of it or not.
However, I think that the above only “disproves” all notions of free will if you divorce your “subconscious” from the rest of your being. Which is where the complication and nuance comes in. What is the “self?” What part of you can you point to as being the “real you?”
From a Christian perspective, you might say the “self” is your soul, which is not yet proven by science, and thus the above has no bearing on, as it cannot take the soul into account. But from the opposite side of the spectrum, from a Buddhist perspective, there is no eternal, unchanging, independently existing “self.” And as such, the mind in its entirety, concious awarness or not, is just another part of your aggregates, and from that perspective it can be argued that a decision is no less your own just because it was not made in your conscious awareness.
With my ramblings aside, I am a Buddhist and so my opinion is that we do have free will, we’re just not always consciously aware of every decision we make. And while we cannot always directly control every decision we make, we can influence and “train” our autopilot reactions to make better decisions.
There’s no evidence for free will. Every physical process involved in the function of our bodies and brains has so far proven to be deterministic in every way we can verify. That doesn’t mean you can’t have an original thought though, it just means that any original thought you have was necessarily going to happen and couldn’t possibly have happened any other way. It’s fate.
Doesn’t matter either way.
I agree. But then I am a pragmatist, which tends to make people extremely mad
Is there a tl;dr for that?
Sure:
It appears, then, that the rule for attaining the third grade of clearness of apprehension is as follows: Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.
– C. S. Peirce
I don’t see why that would make anyone angry, but I also can’t understand what the hell it actually means. “The third grade of clearness of apprehension”? “Might conceivably”?
Well, understandable. It’s one line out of a book, out of context. What he means is that no metaphysical nonsense actually matters, if it doesn’t have real-world consequences. I.e. someone can claim Russell’s Teapot actually exists, and rest of us can just ignore them because it’s untestable and inconsequential.
This has made very many philosophers very angry, but I don’t expect anyone who’s not interested in philosophy to care.
Ah I gotcha. That’s an actual tl;dr. Makes sense to me and I agree.
OK let’s just start with the assertion that there of a casual link back to the beginning of time.
We will begin with the big one first. We don’t even know if time had a beginning.
If we assume that time began at the instant of the big bang. There is no plausible link between my bean induced fart, and some random energy fluctuation, there are just too many chaotic interactions between then and now.
There are so many things we don’t know, making the extremely bold claim that free will doesn’t exist, is dangerously naive.
We can’t even solve Navier-Stokes; neuronal interaction is so far beyond what we are currently capable of, it’s ridiculous.
My recommendation to anyone contemplating this question. Assume free will exists; if you are wrong, it will made no difference; you were destined to believe that anyway.
This seems like a very weird way to look at the issue.
For one, not being able to understand minute, uncountable connections and interactions doesn’t mean we can’t realize a broader relationship of causality between them and our own actions. There are many things we don’t know - that’s right and undeniable - but there are also many things we do know, or at least that we think we know. Sure, you can go around saying “we understand so little about [virtually any scientific discipline], might as well assume that whatever soothes my psyche is true,” but just because the first part of that statement is true doesn’t mean the whole thing is reasonable. In my opinion, by the way, it isn’t reasonable.
Assume free will exists; if you are wrong, it will made no difference;
Here’s a question for you: if you assume free will doesn’t exist, what difference does it make? I mean, you still feel like it exists, you live your life as if experiencing it, and regardless of whether you, as an individual, believe it or not, the world continues on as if it does exist. I really see no difference, in practical terms, between believing free will exists or not.
A little off-topic, but this reminds me of those people that say that morality can’t exist outside of religion. You say you’re an atheist, and then they ask you why you don’t go around killing people. Hopefully you understand what I’m talking about here.
It is not really weird, OP is arguing that the universe itself is deterministic. Taking a mechanistic approach to refuting that claim is perfectly valid.
There are a myriad of examples of physical processes that are chaotic, this invalidates OP’s claim.
To address the morality point, if God is the source of goodness and morality; beyond the question of “which God?” ; it means objective morality doesn’t exist, because God can change it’s mind about what is “good”.
But that is a discussion finds a different threat.
Even if the universe is nondeterministic like quantum physics suggests you still don’t have free will because your thoughts and feelings are still ruled by physical processes even when they are random.
But you don’t need physics to dispute free will. Schopenhauer already said that you may do what you want. But you cannot will what you want. Einstein used that realisation to not take everything too seriously even when people act infuriating.
your thoughts and feelings are still ruled by physical processes
citation needed
For real though, they have even identified the hormone responsible for the “this was my idea” feeling. But I’m too lazy to google it.
You exist in the brain, which is ruled by physical processes. Not sure what citations you need for that.
/me gestures in the general direction of the model of particle physics (and neuroscience)
